On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
A benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two-sided markets.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Economics Letters |
Volume | 104 |
Issue number | 2 |
Pages (from-to) | 86-88 |
Number of pages | 3 |
ISSN | 0165-1765 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2009 |
- Faculty of Social Sciences - unit taxes, revenue-dominance, welfare-dominance, monopoly
Research areas
ID: 12236543