The Body in Action
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The Body in Action. / Grünbaum, Thor.
In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2008, p. 243-261.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The Body in Action
AU - Grünbaum, Thor
PY - 2008
Y1 - 2008
N2 - This article is about how to describe an agent's awareness of her bodilymovements when she is aware of executing an action for a reason. Against currentorthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent's experience of moving has anepistemic place in the agent's awareness of her own intentional action. In "Theproblem," I describe why this should be thought to be problematic. In "Motives fordenying epistemic role," I state some of the main motives for denying that bodilyawareness has any epistemic role to play in the content of the agent's awareness ofher own action. In "Kinaesthetic awareness and control," I sketch how I think theexperience of moving and the bodily sense of agency or control are best described.On this background, I move on to present, in "Arguments for epistemic role," threearguments in favour of the claim that normally the experience of moving isepistemically important to one's awareness of acting intentionally. In the final"Concluding remarks," I round off by raising some of the worries that motivated thedenial of my claim in the first place.
AB - This article is about how to describe an agent's awareness of her bodilymovements when she is aware of executing an action for a reason. Against currentorthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent's experience of moving has anepistemic place in the agent's awareness of her own intentional action. In "Theproblem," I describe why this should be thought to be problematic. In "Motives fordenying epistemic role," I state some of the main motives for denying that bodilyawareness has any epistemic role to play in the content of the agent's awareness ofher own action. In "Kinaesthetic awareness and control," I sketch how I think theexperience of moving and the bodily sense of agency or control are best described.On this background, I move on to present, in "Arguments for epistemic role," threearguments in favour of the claim that normally the experience of moving isepistemically important to one's awareness of acting intentionally. In the final"Concluding remarks," I round off by raising some of the worries that motivated thedenial of my claim in the first place.
KW - Faculty of Humanities
KW - Bodily awareness
KW - Intentional action
KW - Epistemology of action
KW - Sense of agency and ownership
U2 - 10.1007/s11097-007-9072-0
DO - 10.1007/s11097-007-9072-0
M3 - Journal article
VL - 7
SP - 243
EP - 261
JO - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
JF - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
SN - 1568-7759
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 4290421