A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WRP) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
Original language | English |
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Journal | Economics Letters |
Volume | 95 |
Issue number | 3 |
Pages (from-to) | 398-401 |
ISSN | 0165-1765 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2007 |
- Faculty of Social Sciences - noncooperative game theory, weak renegotiation-proofness, repeated Bertrand games
Research areas
ID: 2736855