Attentional role of quota implementation
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In this paper, we introduce a new role of quotas, e.g. labor market quotas: the attentional role. We study the effect of quota implementation on the attention allocation strategy of a rationally inattentive (RI) manager. We find that quotas induce attention: a RI manager who is forced to fulfill a quota, unlike an unrestricted RI manager, never rejects minority candidates without acquiring information about them. We also demonstrate that in our model quotas are behaviorally equivalent to subsidies. In addition, we analyze different goals that the social planner can achieve by implementing quotas. First, quotas can eliminate sta-tistical discrimination, i.e. make the chances of being hired independent from the group identity. Second, when the hiring manager has inaccurate beliefs about the distribution of candidates’ productivities, the so-cial planner can make the manager behave as if she has correct beliefs. Finally, we show how our results can be used to set a quota level that increases the expected value of the chosen candidates.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 105356 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 198 |
Number of pages | 25 |
ISSN | 0022-0531 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 23 Sep 2021 |
- Faculty of Social Sciences - Discrete choice, rational inattention, Multinomial logit, quotas
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