Competition in Soccer Leagues
Research output: Working paper › Research
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Final published version, 203 KB, PDF document
In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings on deadline day in european soccer
Original language | English |
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Publisher | Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen |
Number of pages | 10 |
Publication status | Published - 2007 |
- Faculty of Social Sciences - dimension of quality of players, competition between sports clubs, equilibrium in pure strategies, equilibrium in mixed strategies
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ID: 1677715