Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization
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Decreasing serial cost sharing : an axiomatic characterization. / Hougaard, Jens Leth; Østerdal, Lars Peter Raahave.
In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2009, p. 469-479.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Decreasing serial cost sharing
T2 - an axiomatic characterization
AU - Hougaard, Jens Leth
AU - Østerdal, Lars Peter Raahave
N1 - JEL Classification: D23, D71, L24
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009-1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245-275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178-201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.
AB - The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009-1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245-275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178-201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - cost allocation
U2 - 10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6
DO - 10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6
M3 - Journal article
VL - 38
SP - 469
EP - 479
JO - International Journal of Game Theory
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
SN - 0020-7276
IS - 4
ER -
ID: 16129118