Quiet Politics, Trade Unions, and the Political Elite Network: The Case of Denmark
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Quiet Politics, Trade Unions, and the Political Elite Network : The Case of Denmark. / Ibsen, Christian Lyhne; Ellersgaard, Christoph Houman; Grau Larsen, Anton.
In: Politics and Society, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2021, p. 43-73.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Quiet Politics, Trade Unions, and the Political Elite Network
T2 - The Case of Denmark
AU - Ibsen, Christian Lyhne
AU - Ellersgaard, Christoph Houman
AU - Grau Larsen, Anton
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Pepper Culpepper’s seminal Quiet Politics and Business Power has revitalized the study of when business elites can shape policies away from public scrutiny. This article takes the concept of quiet politics to a new, and surprising, set of actors: trade union leaders. Focusing on the case of Denmark, it argues that quiet politics functions through political elite networks and that this way of doing politics favors a particular kind of corporatist coordination between the state, capital, and labor. Rather than showing macrocorporatist coordination between the two classes and governments, it identifies representatives of business and labor that hold privileged positions in political elite networks. Representatives of segments are found in industries important for the Danish economy, specifically, the exporting manufacturing sector. Being at the core of the network requires not only a key position in the Danish economy but also an understanding that politics is often done best without politicians and voters. The analysis shows that trade union and business association representatives work closely on a wide number of issues through quiet politics, using their extensive network to broker and foster agreement between different stakeholders.
AB - Pepper Culpepper’s seminal Quiet Politics and Business Power has revitalized the study of when business elites can shape policies away from public scrutiny. This article takes the concept of quiet politics to a new, and surprising, set of actors: trade union leaders. Focusing on the case of Denmark, it argues that quiet politics functions through political elite networks and that this way of doing politics favors a particular kind of corporatist coordination between the state, capital, and labor. Rather than showing macrocorporatist coordination between the two classes and governments, it identifies representatives of business and labor that hold privileged positions in political elite networks. Representatives of segments are found in industries important for the Danish economy, specifically, the exporting manufacturing sector. Being at the core of the network requires not only a key position in the Danish economy but also an understanding that politics is often done best without politicians and voters. The analysis shows that trade union and business association representatives work closely on a wide number of issues through quiet politics, using their extensive network to broker and foster agreement between different stakeholders.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - quiet politics
KW - corporatism
KW - trade unions
KW - social networks
KW - elites
KW - comparative political economy
U2 - 10.1177/0032329220985748
DO - 10.1177/0032329220985748
M3 - Journal article
VL - 49
SP - 43
EP - 73
JO - Politics and Society
JF - Politics and Society
SN - 0032-3292
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 257243557