Reputational cheap talk
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Reputational cheap talk. / Ottaviani, Marco; Sørensen, Peter Norman.
In: RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2006, p. 155-175.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Reputational cheap talk
AU - Ottaviani, Marco
AU - Sørensen, Peter Norman
N1 - JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - We analyze information reporting by a privately informed expert concerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert's reputation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to deviate from truthtelling are characterized and shown to depend on the information structure. In equilibrium, experts can credibly communicate only part of their information. Our results also hold when experts have private information about their own accuracy and care about their reputation relative to others
AB - We analyze information reporting by a privately informed expert concerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert's reputation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to deviate from truthtelling are characterized and shown to depend on the information structure. In equilibrium, experts can credibly communicate only part of their information. Our results also hold when experts have private information about their own accuracy and care about their reputation relative to others
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - reputation
KW - equilibrium
M3 - Journal article
VL - 37
SP - 155
EP - 175
JO - RAND Journal of Economics
JF - RAND Journal of Economics
SN - 0741-6261
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 314073