Projection Effects and Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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Projection Effects and Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition. / Jensen, Thomas.
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2007.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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RIS
TY - UNPB
T1 - Projection Effects and Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition
AU - Jensen, Thomas
N1 - JEL Classification: D72, D83
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - Theories from psychology suggest that voters' perceptions of political positions depend on their non-policy related attitudes towards the candidates. A voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive the candidate's position as closer to (further from) his own than it really is. This is called projection. If voters' perceptions are not counterfactual and voting is based on perceived policy positions then projection gives a generally liked candidate an incentive to be ambiguous. In this paper we construct and analyze a formal model to investigate under which conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition, even if voters dislike ambiguity per se
AB - Theories from psychology suggest that voters' perceptions of political positions depend on their non-policy related attitudes towards the candidates. A voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive the candidate's position as closer to (further from) his own than it really is. This is called projection. If voters' perceptions are not counterfactual and voting is based on perceived policy positions then projection gives a generally liked candidate an incentive to be ambiguous. In this paper we construct and analyze a formal model to investigate under which conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition, even if voters dislike ambiguity per se
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - electoral competition
KW - ambiguity
KW - voter perception
KW - cognitive consistency
KW - projection
M3 - Working paper
BT - Projection Effects and Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition
PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
ER -
ID: 877372