‘One of the Challenges that Can Plausibly Be Raised Against Them’? On the Role of Truth in Debates about the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals
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‘One of the Challenges that Can Plausibly Be Raised Against Them’? On the Role of Truth in Debates about the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals. / Holtermann, Jakob v. H.
The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals. red. / Nobuo Hayashi; Cecilia M. Bailliet. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2017. s. 206-227.Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Bidrag til bog/antologi › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - CHAP
T1 - ‘One of the Challenges that Can Plausibly Be Raised Against Them’?
T2 - On the Role of Truth in Debates about the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals
AU - Holtermann, Jakob v. H.
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - International criminal tribunals (ICTs) are epistemic engines in the sense that they find (or claim to find) factual truths about such past events that qualify as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The value of this kind of knowledge would seem to be beyond dispute. Yet, in general the truth-finding aspect of ICTs plays only a very limited role in the often heated debates about their legitimacy. Furthermore, those who actually do address the issue seem widely divided as to whether critiques of the epistemic function of ICTs in fact constitute, in Andreas Føllesdal’s words, one of ‘the challenges that can plausibly be raised against them’ – and if so, in what ways. In this paper, I address the first of these questions asking whether truth-finding should at all be considered a desideratum for ICTs. To this end, I discuss the widespread claim that it should not because the legal truth found in ICT judgements is in fact sui generis; i.e. something categorically different from ordinary truth because exclusively tied to and determined by the legal process as defined in accordance with ideals of due process/fair trial. I argue that this position is ill-founded. Properly understood, truth in law is intimately connected to ordinary truth. Truth-finding capacity therefore does belong in legitimacy debates as a challenge that can plausibly be raised against them. This, in turn makes it relevant, in future research, to map, analyse and interrelate the various critiques that have been launched against the actual truth conduciveness of ICTs.
AB - International criminal tribunals (ICTs) are epistemic engines in the sense that they find (or claim to find) factual truths about such past events that qualify as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The value of this kind of knowledge would seem to be beyond dispute. Yet, in general the truth-finding aspect of ICTs plays only a very limited role in the often heated debates about their legitimacy. Furthermore, those who actually do address the issue seem widely divided as to whether critiques of the epistemic function of ICTs in fact constitute, in Andreas Føllesdal’s words, one of ‘the challenges that can plausibly be raised against them’ – and if so, in what ways. In this paper, I address the first of these questions asking whether truth-finding should at all be considered a desideratum for ICTs. To this end, I discuss the widespread claim that it should not because the legal truth found in ICT judgements is in fact sui generis; i.e. something categorically different from ordinary truth because exclusively tied to and determined by the legal process as defined in accordance with ideals of due process/fair trial. I argue that this position is ill-founded. Properly understood, truth in law is intimately connected to ordinary truth. Truth-finding capacity therefore does belong in legitimacy debates as a challenge that can plausibly be raised against them. This, in turn makes it relevant, in future research, to map, analyse and interrelate the various critiques that have been launched against the actual truth conduciveness of ICTs.
KW - Faculty of Law
KW - Den Internationale Straffedomstol
KW - Legitimitet
KW - sandhed
KW - sandhedskommission
KW - sandhed i retten
KW - retsfilosofi
KW - Kleist (Heinrich von)
KW - Bourdieu, Pierre
KW - International Criminal Court
KW - truth
KW - truth and reconciliation
KW - Truth Commissions
KW - legal epistemology
KW - legal truth
KW - Kleist (Heinrich von)
KW - Bourdieu, Pierre
KW - legitimacy
UR - http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2692994
U2 - 10.1017/9781316536469.009
DO - 10.1017/9781316536469.009
M3 - Book chapter
SN - 9781107146174
SP - 206
EP - 227
BT - The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals
A2 - Hayashi, Nobuo
A2 - Bailliet, Cecilia M.
PB - Cambridge University Press
CY - Cambridge
ER -
ID: 147974419