A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WRP) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
---|---|
Tidsskrift | Economics Letters |
Vol/bind | 95 |
Udgave nummer | 3 |
Sider (fra-til) | 398-401 |
ISSN | 0165-1765 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 2007 |
Bibliografisk note
JEL classification: C72, D43
- Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet
Forskningsområder
ID: 2736855