Competition in Soccer Leagues
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
Dokumenter
- 0731
Forlagets udgivne version, 203 KB, PDF-dokument
In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings on deadline day in european soccer
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Udgiver | Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen |
Antal sider | 10 |
Status | Udgivet - 2007 |
Bibliografisk note
JEL Classification: C72, D21, L83
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