On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets
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On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets. / Kind, Hans Jarle; Köthenbürger, Marko; Schjelderup, Guttorm.
I: Economics Letters, Bind 104, Nr. 2, 2009, s. 86-88.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets
AU - Kind, Hans Jarle
AU - Köthenbürger, Marko
AU - Schjelderup, Guttorm
N1 - JEL classification: H2, D4, L1
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - A benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two-sided markets.
AB - A benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two-sided markets.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - unit taxes
KW - revenue-dominance
KW - welfare-dominance
KW - monopoly
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.010
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.010
M3 - Journal article
VL - 104
SP - 86
EP - 88
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 12236543