Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition
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Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition. / Jensen, Thomas.
I: Public Choice, Bind 141, Nr. 1-2, 2009, s. 213-232.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition
AU - Jensen, Thomas
N1 - JEL Classification: D72, D83
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - Theories from psychology suggest that voters' perceptions of political positions depend on their non-policy related attitudes towards the candidates. A voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive the candidate's position as closer to (further from) his own than it really is. This is called projection. If voters' perceptions are not counterfactual and voting is based on perceived policy positions then projection gives generally liked candidates an incentive to be ambiguous. In this paper we extend the standard Downsian model in order to investigate under what conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition.
AB - Theories from psychology suggest that voters' perceptions of political positions depend on their non-policy related attitudes towards the candidates. A voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive the candidate's position as closer to (further from) his own than it really is. This is called projection. If voters' perceptions are not counterfactual and voting is based on perceived policy positions then projection gives generally liked candidates an incentive to be ambiguous. In this paper we extend the standard Downsian model in order to investigate under what conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - voter perception
KW - projection
U2 - 10.1007/s11127-009-9449-4
DO - 10.1007/s11127-009-9449-4
M3 - Journal article
VL - 141
SP - 213
EP - 232
JO - Public Choice
JF - Public Choice
SN - 0048-5829
IS - 1-2
ER -
ID: 13950074