Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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Self-Organization for Collective Action : An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes. / Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis ; Tyran, Jean-Robert.
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2011.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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RIS
TY - UNPB
T1 - Self-Organization for Collective Action
T2 - An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes
AU - Markussen, Thomas
AU - Putterman, Louis
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert
N1 - JEL Classification: C92, C91, D03, D71, H41
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self-interest should produce a sub-optimal outcome absent sanctions for non-cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically optimal choice of a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions or no sanctions. Most groups adopt formal sanctions when they are of deterrent magnitude and cost a small fraction (10%) of the potential surplus. Contrary to the standard theoretical prediction, however, most groups choose informal sanctions when formal sanctions are more costly (40% of the surplus). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions.
AB - Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self-interest should produce a sub-optimal outcome absent sanctions for non-cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically optimal choice of a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions or no sanctions. Most groups adopt formal sanctions when they are of deterrent magnitude and cost a small fraction (10%) of the potential surplus. Contrary to the standard theoretical prediction, however, most groups choose informal sanctions when formal sanctions are more costly (40% of the surplus). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - formal sanctions
KW - informal sanctions
KW - experiment
KW - cooperation
KW - punishment
M3 - Working paper
BT - Self-Organization for Collective Action
PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
ER -
ID: 32470914