Seeing what I am doing
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- Grunbaum_Seeing what I am doing_PPR2013
Accepted author manuscript, 525 KB, PDF document
I argue against the view that an agent’s knowledge of her own current action cannot in any way rely on perception for its justification. Instead, I argue that when it comes to an agent’s knowledge of her own object-oriented intentional action, the agent’s belief about what she is doing is partly justified by her perception of the object of action. I proceed by first proposing an account of such actions according to which the agent’s knowledge is partly justified by her perception. I then discuss several of objections to my proposal. The most important objection is that I have only managed to show that perception plays an enabling role and not a justificatory role for the agent’s knowledge of her own intentional action
Original language | English |
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Journal | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
Volume | 86 |
Issue number | 2 |
Pages (from-to) | 295-318 |
Number of pages | 24 |
ISSN | 0031-8205 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2013 |
- Faculty of Humanities
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