A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
We use a model of self-centered inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (Quart. J. Econom. 114 (3) (1999) 817) to study voting on redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda. We test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment and find that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self-interest
Original language | English |
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Journal | European Economic Review |
Volume | 50 |
Issue number | 2 |
Pages (from-to) | 469-485 |
ISSN | 0014-2921 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2006 |
- Faculty of Social Sciences - fairness, voting, redistribution
Research areas
ID: 314125