A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies
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A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies. / Andersson, Ola; Wengström, Erik Roland.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 95, No. 3, 2007, p. 398-401.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies
AU - Andersson, Ola
AU - Wengström, Erik Roland
N1 - JEL classification: C72, D43
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WRP) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
AB - Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WRP) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - noncooperative game theory
KW - weak renegotiation-proofness
KW - repeated Bertrand games
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014
M3 - Journal article
VL - 95
SP - 398
EP - 401
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
IS - 3
ER -
ID: 2736855