The dilemmas of tax coordination in the enlarged European Union
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Standard
The dilemmas of tax coordination in the enlarged European Union. / Brøchner, Jens; Jensen, Jesper; Svensson, Patrik; Sørensen, Peter Birch.
In: CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2007, p. 561-595.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Harvard
APA
Vancouver
Author
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - The dilemmas of tax coordination in the enlarged European Union
AU - Brøchner, Jens
AU - Jensen, Jesper
AU - Svensson, Patrik
AU - Sørensen, Peter Birch
N1 - JEL classification: H25, H73, H87
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - This study evaluates the economic effects of corporate tax coordination in the enlarged European Union (EU) using a computable general equilibrium model. Our main findings are as follows: (i) Corporate tax coordination can yield modest aggregate welfare gains. The 2004 enlargement of the EU has increased the potential gains from tax harmonization, provided corporate tax rates and tax bases are harmonized at their unweighted averages. (ii) All scenarios for coordination leave some EU Member States as winners and others as losers. An agreement on tax coordination is therefore likely to require elaborate compensation mechanisms. (iii) The large and diverse country effects suggest that Enhanced Cooperation for a subset of the Member States may be the most likely route towards tax coordination. (iv) Identifying winners and losers from coordination for the purpose of a compensation mechanism may be problematic, since countries experiencing gains in GDP and welfare tend to lose tax revenues, and vice versa
AB - This study evaluates the economic effects of corporate tax coordination in the enlarged European Union (EU) using a computable general equilibrium model. Our main findings are as follows: (i) Corporate tax coordination can yield modest aggregate welfare gains. The 2004 enlargement of the EU has increased the potential gains from tax harmonization, provided corporate tax rates and tax bases are harmonized at their unweighted averages. (ii) All scenarios for coordination leave some EU Member States as winners and others as losers. An agreement on tax coordination is therefore likely to require elaborate compensation mechanisms. (iii) The large and diverse country effects suggest that Enhanced Cooperation for a subset of the Member States may be the most likely route towards tax coordination. (iv) Identifying winners and losers from coordination for the purpose of a compensation mechanism may be problematic, since countries experiencing gains in GDP and welfare tend to lose tax revenues, and vice versa
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - Corporate tax harmonization
KW - EU tax coordination
U2 - 10.1093/cesifo/ifm017
DO - 10.1093/cesifo/ifm017
M3 - Journal article
VL - 53
SP - 561
EP - 595
JO - CESifo Economic Studies
JF - CESifo Economic Studies
SN - 1610-241X
IS - 4
ER -
ID: 2722867