The Strategic Nature of Compliance: An Empirical Evaluation of Law Implementation in the Central Monitoring System of the European Union.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Standard
The Strategic Nature of Compliance : An Empirical Evaluation of Law Implementation in the Central Monitoring System of the European Union. . / König, Thomas; Mäder, Lars Kai.
In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 58, No. 1, 01.01.2014, p. 246–263.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Harvard
APA
Vancouver
Author
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - The Strategic Nature of Compliance
T2 - An Empirical Evaluation of Law Implementation in the Central Monitoring System of the European Union.
AU - König, Thomas
AU - Mäder, Lars Kai
PY - 2014/1/1
Y1 - 2014/1/1
N2 - This compliance study models correct and timely implementation of policies in a multilevel system as a strategic game between a central monitoring agency and multiple implementers and evaluates statistically the empirical implications of this model. We test whether compliance is determined by the anticipated enforcement decision of the monitoring agency and whether this agency is responsive to the probability of enforcement success and the potential sanctioning costs produced by noncomplying implementers. Compared to other monitoring systems, the centralized monitoring system of the European Union (EU) is praised for exemplary effectiveness, but our findings reveal that the monitoring agency refrains from enforcing compliance when the probability of success is low, and the sanctioning costs are high. This results in a compliance deficit, even though the selective enforcement activities of the monitoring agency are almost always successful before court.
AB - This compliance study models correct and timely implementation of policies in a multilevel system as a strategic game between a central monitoring agency and multiple implementers and evaluates statistically the empirical implications of this model. We test whether compliance is determined by the anticipated enforcement decision of the monitoring agency and whether this agency is responsive to the probability of enforcement success and the potential sanctioning costs produced by noncomplying implementers. Compared to other monitoring systems, the centralized monitoring system of the European Union (EU) is praised for exemplary effectiveness, but our findings reveal that the monitoring agency refrains from enforcing compliance when the probability of success is low, and the sanctioning costs are high. This results in a compliance deficit, even though the selective enforcement activities of the monitoring agency are almost always successful before court.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - COMPLIANCE
KW - EUROPEAN Union law
KW - EUROPEAN integration
KW - SANCTIONS (International law)
U2 - 10.1111/ajps.12038
DO - 10.1111/ajps.12038
M3 - Journal article
VL - 58
SP - 246
EP - 263
JO - American Journal of Political Science
JF - American Journal of Political Science
SN - 0092-5853
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 141704814