Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory?
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Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory? / Grünbaum, Thor; Kyllingsbæk, Søren.
In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 2, 06.2020, p. 385-404.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory?
AU - Grünbaum, Thor
AU - Kyllingsbæk, Søren
PY - 2020/6
Y1 - 2020/6
N2 - When a person decides to do something in the future, she forms an intention and her intention persists. Philosophers have thought about the rational requirement that an agent’s intention persists until its execution. But philosophers have neglected to think about the causal memory mechanisms that could enable this kind of persistence and its role in rational long-term agency. Our aim of this paper is to fill this gap by arguing that memory for intention is a specific kind of memory. We do this by evaluating and rejecting standard declarative accounts of memory for intention and arguing for the plausibility of an alternative model of memory for intention. We argue for the alternative by spelling out a number of computational principles that could enable retaining and retrieving intentions from long-term memory. These principles could explain a number of core features of intentions.
AB - When a person decides to do something in the future, she forms an intention and her intention persists. Philosophers have thought about the rational requirement that an agent’s intention persists until its execution. But philosophers have neglected to think about the causal memory mechanisms that could enable this kind of persistence and its role in rational long-term agency. Our aim of this paper is to fill this gap by arguing that memory for intention is a specific kind of memory. We do this by evaluating and rejecting standard declarative accounts of memory for intention and arguing for the plausibility of an alternative model of memory for intention. We argue for the alternative by spelling out a number of computational principles that could enable retaining and retrieving intentions from long-term memory. These principles could explain a number of core features of intentions.
KW - Faculty of Humanities
KW - Philosophy of action
KW - Philosophy of memory
KW - Rationality
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - computational model
KW - Prospective memory
U2 - 10.1007/s13164-020-00479-5
DO - 10.1007/s13164-020-00479-5
M3 - Journal article
VL - 11
SP - 385
EP - 404
JO - Review of Philosophy and Psychology
JF - Review of Philosophy and Psychology
SN - 1878-5158
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 241752001