Optimal counterterrorism and the recruitment effect of large terrorist attacks: A simple dynamic model
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Standard
Optimal counterterrorism and the recruitment effect of large terrorist attacks : A simple dynamic model. / Jensen, Thomas.
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1, 01.01.2011, p. 69-86.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Harvard
APA
Vancouver
Author
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - Optimal counterterrorism and the recruitment effect of large terrorist attacks
T2 - A simple dynamic model
AU - Jensen, Thomas
PY - 2011/1/1
Y1 - 2011/1/1
N2 - We analyze a simple dynamic model of the interaction between terrorists and authorities. Our primary aim is to study optimal counterterrorism and its consequences when large terrorist attacks lead to a temporary increase in terrorist recruitment. First, we show that an increase in counterterrorism makes it more likely that terrorist cells plan small rather than large attacks and therefore may increase the probability of a successful attack. Analyzing optimal counterterrorism we see that the recruitment effect makes authorities increase the level of counterterrorism after large attacks. Therefore, in periods following large attacks a new attack is more likely to be small compared to other periods. Finally, we analyze the long-run consequences of the recruitment effect. We show that it leads to more counterterrorism, more small attacks, and a higher sum of terrorism damage and counterterrorism costs. On the other hand, it leads to fewer large attacks and less damage.
AB - We analyze a simple dynamic model of the interaction between terrorists and authorities. Our primary aim is to study optimal counterterrorism and its consequences when large terrorist attacks lead to a temporary increase in terrorist recruitment. First, we show that an increase in counterterrorism makes it more likely that terrorist cells plan small rather than large attacks and therefore may increase the probability of a successful attack. Analyzing optimal counterterrorism we see that the recruitment effect makes authorities increase the level of counterterrorism after large attacks. Therefore, in periods following large attacks a new attack is more likely to be small compared to other periods. Finally, we analyze the long-run consequences of the recruitment effect. We show that it leads to more counterterrorism, more small attacks, and a higher sum of terrorism damage and counterterrorism costs. On the other hand, it leads to fewer large attacks and less damage.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - terrorism
KW - formal modelling
U2 - 10.1177/0951629810384304
DO - 10.1177/0951629810384304
M3 - Journal article
VL - 23
SP - 69
EP - 86
JO - Journal of Theoretical Politics
JF - Journal of Theoretical Politics
SN - 0951-6298
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 32337570