Reflecting on life, not on the mind – The concept of self-reflection without stability
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Reflecting on life, not on the mind – The concept of self-reflection without stability. / Jensen, Lasse Meinert.
2011. Paper presented at 14th Biennial Conference of the International Society for Theoretical Psychology, Thessaloniki, Greece.Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › Research › peer-review
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TY - CONF
T1 - Reflecting on life, not on the mind – The concept of self-reflection without stability
AU - Jensen, Lasse Meinert
PY - 2011/6/30
Y1 - 2011/6/30
N2 - This paper presents a critique of the concept of “reflection” and a theoretical alternative. I’ll argue that current notions of reflections to a large extend deals only with “meta-reflection” or “self-reflection”, and that the main problem with such conceptualizations is their preoccupation with “stability”. When self-reflection is conceptualized as a second-order process charged with creating diachronic continuity in the person’s life, as it often is in both philosophy (Frankfurt, 1971), cognitive theory (Carver, Scheier & Fulton, 2008), and narrative theories of personality (McAdams, 2008), “Stability” and how it is brought about, becomes the main concern. But presupposing “stability” as the main aim of self-reflection isolates reflection to a mental realm.Human beings are certainly self-conscious, but – following Dreier (1999), when he points out that reflection is not a distancing from, but part of the person’s engagement with the world – I’ll focus on a theoretical conceptualization of reflection as an activity that persons carry out in the context of their life course.I’ll take up Schatzki’s notion of social order as an arrangement in which entities relate, occupy positions, and possess meaning (Schatzki, 2002; p. 19), and argue for understanding reflection as temporal-spatial activities arranging interests, plans, and concerns in the given practices of the persons’ life course. I’ll maintain that the alternative view of “reflection” presented here still makes room for notions of “identity” or “2nd order processes”, but that such concepts should be understood differently – especially concerning how such “diachronic” constructs affect “synchronous” activities. In order to illustrate this, I’ll draw on examples from an empirical study of courses of daily activities, to show how everyday situations are related to what the person holds to be of importance to his/her life.
AB - This paper presents a critique of the concept of “reflection” and a theoretical alternative. I’ll argue that current notions of reflections to a large extend deals only with “meta-reflection” or “self-reflection”, and that the main problem with such conceptualizations is their preoccupation with “stability”. When self-reflection is conceptualized as a second-order process charged with creating diachronic continuity in the person’s life, as it often is in both philosophy (Frankfurt, 1971), cognitive theory (Carver, Scheier & Fulton, 2008), and narrative theories of personality (McAdams, 2008), “Stability” and how it is brought about, becomes the main concern. But presupposing “stability” as the main aim of self-reflection isolates reflection to a mental realm.Human beings are certainly self-conscious, but – following Dreier (1999), when he points out that reflection is not a distancing from, but part of the person’s engagement with the world – I’ll focus on a theoretical conceptualization of reflection as an activity that persons carry out in the context of their life course.I’ll take up Schatzki’s notion of social order as an arrangement in which entities relate, occupy positions, and possess meaning (Schatzki, 2002; p. 19), and argue for understanding reflection as temporal-spatial activities arranging interests, plans, and concerns in the given practices of the persons’ life course. I’ll maintain that the alternative view of “reflection” presented here still makes room for notions of “identity” or “2nd order processes”, but that such concepts should be understood differently – especially concerning how such “diachronic” constructs affect “synchronous” activities. In order to illustrate this, I’ll draw on examples from an empirical study of courses of daily activities, to show how everyday situations are related to what the person holds to be of importance to his/her life.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - Self-reflection
KW - Personality
KW - Self-regulation
KW - Day Reconstruction Method
KW - Critical Psychology
M3 - Paper
Y2 - 27 June 2011 through 1 July 2011
ER -
ID: 49738045