Knowing other Minds: A Scorekeeping Model
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Knowing other Minds : A Scorekeeping Model. / Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico.
In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 14, 2023, p. 1279-1308.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Knowing other Minds
T2 - A Scorekeeping Model
AU - Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - The prepositional ‘in’ and possessive pronouns, e.g., ‘my’ and ‘mine,’ in the context of attributions of mental states, such as “in my mind” or “in your mind,” threaten to confuse attempts to account for knowledge of other minds. This paper distinguishes proper from improper uses of such expressions. I will argue that proper use of the prepositional ‘in’ and possessive pronouns in the context of mental state attributions presupposes capacities to properly track and attribute what are really, in a sense to be specified, intersubjectively articulated and inferentially interrelated normative statuses. What we call “mental states” or “minds,” in as far as primarily cognitive states such as beliefs are concerned, are intersubjectively constituted. As opposed to being inner and private, something we must learn to intersubjectively discover, minds and mental states are intersubjectively articulated and we learn to attribute them as inner and private. A scorekeeping-model is used to illustrate how the privacy of mind presupposes intersubjectivity. Using that model, I argue that the traditional problem of knowing other minds can be re-framed as a problem of learning how to pursue intersubjective practices of acknowledging, attributing and undertaking mental states.
AB - The prepositional ‘in’ and possessive pronouns, e.g., ‘my’ and ‘mine,’ in the context of attributions of mental states, such as “in my mind” or “in your mind,” threaten to confuse attempts to account for knowledge of other minds. This paper distinguishes proper from improper uses of such expressions. I will argue that proper use of the prepositional ‘in’ and possessive pronouns in the context of mental state attributions presupposes capacities to properly track and attribute what are really, in a sense to be specified, intersubjectively articulated and inferentially interrelated normative statuses. What we call “mental states” or “minds,” in as far as primarily cognitive states such as beliefs are concerned, are intersubjectively constituted. As opposed to being inner and private, something we must learn to intersubjectively discover, minds and mental states are intersubjectively articulated and we learn to attribute them as inner and private. A scorekeeping-model is used to illustrate how the privacy of mind presupposes intersubjectivity. Using that model, I argue that the traditional problem of knowing other minds can be re-framed as a problem of learning how to pursue intersubjective practices of acknowledging, attributing and undertaking mental states.
KW - Faculty of Humanities
KW - Other minds
KW - intersubjectivity
KW - normativity
KW - scorekeeping
KW - me-ness
KW - developmental psychology
U2 - 10.1007/s13164-022-00642-0
DO - 10.1007/s13164-022-00642-0
M3 - Journal article
VL - 14
SP - 1279
EP - 1308
JO - Review of Philosophy and Psychology
JF - Review of Philosophy and Psychology
SN - 1878-5158
ER -
ID: 333306627