Praetorius, N. (2004) Intersubjectivity of Cognition and language. Principled Reasons why the Subject may be Trusted. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3, 195-214
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Praetorius, N. (2004) Intersubjectivity of Cognition and language. Principled Reasons why the Subject may be Trusted. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3, 195-214. / Praetorius, Nini.
In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 3, 2004, p. 195-214.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Praetorius, N. (2004) Intersubjectivity of Cognition and language. Principled Reasons why the Subject may be Trusted. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3, 195-214
AU - Praetorius, Nini
PY - 2004
Y1 - 2004
N2 - The paper aims to show that scepticism concerning the status of first-person reports of mental states and their use as evidence in scientific cognitive research is unfounded. Rather,principled arguments suggest that the conditions for the intersubjectivity of cognition and description of publicly observable things apply equally for our cognition and description of our mental or internal states. It is argued that on these conditions relies the possibility of developing well-defined scientific criteria for distinguishing between first-person and third-person cognition and description. The paper concludes by outlining the consequences for cognitive research and for functional theories of mind
AB - The paper aims to show that scepticism concerning the status of first-person reports of mental states and their use as evidence in scientific cognitive research is unfounded. Rather,principled arguments suggest that the conditions for the intersubjectivity of cognition and description of publicly observable things apply equally for our cognition and description of our mental or internal states. It is argued that on these conditions relies the possibility of developing well-defined scientific criteria for distinguishing between first-person and third-person cognition and description. The paper concludes by outlining the consequences for cognitive research and for functional theories of mind
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - consciousness, cognition, intersubjectivity, language, subjectivity
M3 - Journal article
VL - 3
SP - 195
EP - 214
JO - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
JF - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
SN - 1568-7759
ER -
ID: 224202475