Inequality and Political Clientelism: Evidence from South India
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Inequality and Political Clientelism : Evidence from South India. / Markussen, Thomas.
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2010.Research output: Working paper › Research
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Inequality and Political Clientelism
T2 - Evidence from South India
AU - Markussen, Thomas
N1 - JEL classification: D31, D72, H7, O1
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The paper discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be strongly affected by economic inequality.
AB - Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The paper discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be strongly affected by economic inequality.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - fattigdom
KW - Indien
KW - decentralization
KW - patronage
KW - clientelism
KW - poverty
KW - India
M3 - Working paper
BT - Inequality and Political Clientelism
PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
ER -
ID: 22433042