Stabilization Mechanisms for Nuclear Investments v. Electricity Market Liberalization: The Case of Contract for Difference: Lessons from the United Kingdom and Romania
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Stabilization Mechanisms for Nuclear Investments v. Electricity Market Liberalization: The Case of Contract for Difference : Lessons from the United Kingdom and Romania. / Stanescu, Catalin Gabriel.
In: European Energy and Environmental Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 6, 2018, p. 223-235.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Stabilization Mechanisms for Nuclear Investments v. Electricity Market Liberalization: The Case of Contract for Difference
T2 - Lessons from the United Kingdom and Romania
AU - Stanescu, Catalin Gabriel
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - The article addresses Contracts for Difference as state aid and price stabilization mechanisms needed to mitigate the risks stemming from the incompatibility of liberalized energy markets and nuclear energy investments. It starts by defining the Contract for Difference mechanism as state aid required to support nuclear investments. It continues by analyzing the issue of state aid in relation to the nuclear sector, with focus on the “market failure” argument as it transpires from both the European Commission’s assessment of the state aid scheme and the decision of the Grand Chamber of The Court of Justice of the European Union. Attention is dedicated to the uses of the same support scheme in two similar nuclear projects in Hinkley Point (United Kingdom) and Cernavoda (Romania). The article concludes that given the systemic differences between the two national energy markets, Contracts for Difference might not be a suitable solution for both of them.
AB - The article addresses Contracts for Difference as state aid and price stabilization mechanisms needed to mitigate the risks stemming from the incompatibility of liberalized energy markets and nuclear energy investments. It starts by defining the Contract for Difference mechanism as state aid required to support nuclear investments. It continues by analyzing the issue of state aid in relation to the nuclear sector, with focus on the “market failure” argument as it transpires from both the European Commission’s assessment of the state aid scheme and the decision of the Grand Chamber of The Court of Justice of the European Union. Attention is dedicated to the uses of the same support scheme in two similar nuclear projects in Hinkley Point (United Kingdom) and Cernavoda (Romania). The article concludes that given the systemic differences between the two national energy markets, Contracts for Difference might not be a suitable solution for both of them.
KW - Faculty of Law
KW - Energy
KW - nuclear energy
KW - state aid
KW - market liberalization
KW - Hinkley Point
KW - Cernavoda
KW - market failure
M3 - Journal article
VL - 27
SP - 223
EP - 235
JO - European Energy and Environmental Law Review
JF - European Energy and Environmental Law Review
SN - 1879-3886
IS - 6
ER -
ID: 209382622